by Vinolen John, @vinolenjohn
Studies concerning histories of conflicts are always a thin line to tread. This is particularly true with regards to Naga History which revolves around facets of decolonisation, nation and identity construction, insurgency and conflict, inter alia.
The Nagas are a group of disparate tribes in the highlands of India’s northeast and Burma’s northwest characterized by a societal system based around autonomous village republics. These had remained in relative isolation from any mainstream state formations up until they were confronted by the forces of British colonization toward the later stages of the 19th century. In spite of this, a large number of Naga tribes remained untouched and unadministered even up until British withdrawal from India in 1947, after which the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act which sought to place the Union of India as the successor state to all lands governed by the British in the subcontinent.
Therefore it is not a surprise that a large section of the Naga populace – hitherto a heterogenous group of people – united and rallied behind A.Z. Phizo in their demands for a sovereign nation. India on the other hand saw this as a threat to its territorial integrity and after initial attempts at negotiation with the NNC (Naga National Council) ended in failure, the extremists led by Phizo took center stage in Naga politics resulting in the outbreak of a full-fledged Indo-Naga conflict by 1954. Dominant narratives of historical reconstructions of this period take parallel yet opposite positions with the Indian side. They portray a paternalistic view of the situation, where a group of primitive and savage tribes caused major violence, leading to loss of life despite being provided autonomy and safeguards in the Indian constitution. On the other hand, Naga writers generally write of a people fighting for their right to self-determination against a postcolonial colonial power and the brutality of the repressive measures of the Indian state. The lack of mainstream media attention to the Naga issue, as well as the fact that the Indian administration itself was in a nascent state, and in an environment of transition and confusion during this time, adds to its ambiguity.
The question that almost all scholarly work in this field finds itself dealing with is how and why the conflict began. In this regard, a fresh perspective was introduced by Bernice Guyot-Rechard in her work on NEFA. This questions the extent to which the Indian state made its presence effectively felt in the region, in regions which were historically characterized as ‘blank spaces’ in the days of colonial administration. It also examines what decolonization means in areas where the colonial state was barely ever present, as well as how these spaces shape postcolonial processes of state making and nation building.[1]
I would like to highlight a perhaps deeper hidden subconscious clash in Naga society in relation to systems of existence itself. In this context, theoretical explanations for the category of ethnic nationalization that the Naga fit into are many and perhaps irrelevant to this discussion. However, what we must acknowledge is that these categories were processes both from within and without, by the Nagas themselves and by the Indian state respectively. The subconscious resistance to this process can be traced to the nature of Naga society itself by linking it with the concept of Zomia, a counter-narrative to the conventional account of western modernity. Here, the preconceived assumption that ‘once people are exposed to the conveniences of modernism vis-à-vis the modern state, they will assimilate’ is questioned.[2] Both the ideas of modernization and sovereignty that the Naga leaders desired came face to face against not only the Indian state but also against the fundamental stateless disposition of tribal Naga society.
The formation of the NNC by the Nagas is a classic case of ethnic mobilization in the context of common interests and a common adversary where ‘one specific identification becomes primary and overriding and prompts one to join a particular group’.[3] This however did not mean traditional power structures vanished overnight. Just as a new coat of paint does not change the house, the socio-cultural patterns and relations that the Nagas built over the centuries could not be undone by papering over the cracks by incorporating systems and concepts hitherto alien to the Naga way of life. The NNC itself emerged as a result of a messy process of decolonization, a situation that rather ‘forced’ it to come into existence.[4] Inherently (and broadly speaking) the modern nation-state is based on the idea that ‘territorial loyalty which passes for nationalism’ which seeks to substitute primordial loyalties to clan, tribe, caste, race, community and even language. The contradiction this causes results in ‘disloyalty to the hitherto unfamiliar values of the nation state’.[5]
Most scholars acknowledge that in order to understand postcolonial Naga history one must be exposed to its historical background and ethos of the Nagas. However, they tend to disregard this approach once ‘modernization’ of Naga society begins to take shape and with it a political conscience. It is important to recognize that the enduring influence of historical realities persist in shaping future trajectories. All socio-political processes that have taken place over the last seven decades can be traced to this simple point that the enduring influence of historical realities persists in shaping future trajectories where Naga society is concerned. Be it the disintegration of the Naga National Movement into tribal factions,[6] the demands for a ‘Frontier Nagaland’,[7] the nature of corruption and societal incompatibility with democratic process itself,[8] they are all natural repercussions of the forced conversion of a Zomia people into the colors of Westphalia.
[1] Guyot-Rechard, Bernice, Decolonization and state making on India’s north-east frontier, c. 1943-62, (University of Cambridge, 2014), see Ch. 1.
[2] Scott, James C, The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, (Yale University Press, 2009), p.14-16; ‘Zomia’ here as a geographical category refers to the Southeast Asian highlands of which modern Nagaland is a part.
[3] Glazer, Nathan, & Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Beyond the melting pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City, (M.I.T. Press, 1970), p.159.
[4] Kevichusa in a conversation with Archer regarding tribal councils informs that the NNC had been urgently formed only in response to the British Cabinet Mission, see ‘Manuscript notes made by W.G. Archer between 1946 & 1948, and miscellaneous papers and letters’ ref.no. 17:22 in Cambridge Videodisc Project (Cambridge University Library).
[5] Chaube, Shibani Kinkar, Hill Politics in North-east India, (Orient Longman, 1999).
[6] The NNC split into various factions in less than half a century with the Sema group splitting and forming the RGN after the assassination of General Kaito in 1968 by Angami supremacists, further divisions took place after the Shillong Accord of 1975 with NSCN-IM dominated by the Tangkhuls and NSCN-K by the Konyaks.
[7] ‘Eastern Nagaland’ comprising the areas formerly the TFD and the unadministered regions (under the colonial government) have since 1997 been demanding a separate state spearheaded by the Eastern Nagaland Public Organization (ENPO).
[8] See, Wouters, Jelle J P, Nagas as a Society Against Voting: And Other Essays, (Highlander Press, 2023).
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